DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE LIMIT: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? EVIDENCE FROM INDIA
Abstract
Deposit insurance is one of the safety nets employed by nations to ensure banking stability and depositor protection. Determining the appropriate coverage limit for depositors under a system of explicit deposit insurance is one of the most important policy decisions. This study examines the adequacy of deposit insurance coverage limit, through a case of India, to determine the appropriate level of coverage. The study also investigates the suitability of the recent five-fold increase in the coverage limit of India. Time series data from 1993-94 to 2017-18 has been employed for the regression analysis. India’s data has been compared with several countries with similar deposit insurance characteristics, using a t-test of sample means, over the period 2003 to 2017. The results show that the real coverage limit as well as the coverage ratio in India has been declining over the sample period. Moreover, India’s position has tumbled vis-à-vis its peers in terms of coverage ratio. The findings suggest that the increase in India’s coverage limit, after almost 27 years, is a much-needed move. The increase is enough to bring back India’s coverage limit to comparable levels; however, this one-time increase is not sufficient in isolation of other policy variables.
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